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CORRUPTION                                                                                    
AS A DIFFUSE INSTITUTE
Shmerlina I.A.
Purpose. The purpose of the article is critical examination of the 
institutional treatment of corruption and revealing the limitations of 
such an approach. 
Methodology. The theoretical framework of the article is institutional 
analyses in their sociological and neo-institutional versions. 
Results. Starting from the sociological understanding of social 
institute as a complex, multi-layered, indirect, transpersonal form 
of social regulation, we examine from this angle the nature of cor-
ruption. The concept of corruption as a diffuse institute is suggest-
ed. This concept accounts for the system and structural features of 
corruption on the one hand and, on the other hand, pinpoints the 
discrepancy between this phenomenon and the full content of the 
term ‘social institute’.
Practical implications. Treating corruption as a diffuse institute 
certainly involves an assessment of potential efficiency of different 
counteracting measures. However, above all, it is a question of di-
agnosing this social phenomenon, which should be more profound 
and nuanced than simply understanding it as an informal institute. 
Keywords: social institute; corruption; neo-institutionalism; rules 
of the game; informal institute; diffuse institute.
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КОРРУПЦИЯ КАК ДИФФУЗНЫЙ ИНСТИТУТ
Шмерлина И.А.
Цель. Целью статьи является критический анализ институци-
ональной трактовки коррупции и выявление ограничений данного 
подхода. 
Методология. Теоретико-методологической рамкой работы вы-
ступает институциональный анализ в его социологической и нео-
институциональной версиях.  
Результаты. Отталкиваясь от социологического понимания 
социального института как сложной, многоуровневой, непрямой, 
надличностной формы социальной регуляции, автор исследует в 
этом ракурсе природу коррупции. Предложено понимание корруп-
ции как диффузного института. Данное понятие, с одной стороны, 
позволяет учесть системные и структурные признаки коррупции, 
а, с другой, акцентирует различия между данным феноменом и 
«социальным институтом» в полном объеме данной категории. 
Область применения результатов. Трактовка коррупции как 
диффузного института помогает оценить потенциальную эффек-
тивность различных антикоррупционных мер. Однако прежде всего 
она связана с диагностикой данного социального феномена, более 
глубокой и нюансированной, нежели просто понимание коррупции 
как неформального института. 
Ключевые слова: социальный институт; коррупция; нео-инсти-
туционализм; правила игры; неформальный институт; диффузный 
институт.
The problem statement
It would seem that over the last eleven decades5, the issue of corrup-
tion has been studied far and wide. Virtually every paper discusses the 
5While the theme of corruption is as old as the world, in modern discourse it ap-
peared, ac-cording to Rogozin [8], relatively recently – in 1904 – and real interest in 
it began to form only in the 1990s. According to Calhoun, «over the last few decades 
interest in and attention toward corruption has increased exponentially» [29, p. 12].
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concept of corruption (e.g. [4; 7; 12; 17; 29; 39; 43; 44; 47; 52–54; 56; 65; 
69; 70; 81; 82; 85; 86; 89; 91; 94; 98; 99; 110; 117–119]); much attention 
is paid to the history [36; 37; 99; 115] and causes of corruption (e.g., 
[5; 12; 28; 30; 53; 89; 90; 104; 122]) and to the history of studying it 
and the reasons for the interest in this subject [4; 12; 24; 40; 56; 94; 119].
Corruption is studied through both regional and cross-cultural per-
spectives [6; 23; 30; 38; 41; 42; 46; 49; 50; 56; 64; 69; 73; 95; 96; 99; 
97; 103; 111; 112; 120; 121]; with the 1993 emergence of Transparency 
International, the study of corruption actually turned into a separate 
branch—”a science of comparison” [119, p. 468]. Furthermore, the sub-
ject of obtaining a measurement of corruption generated “the business 
of metrics” [119, p. 475] (on the subject of measurement of corruption, 
see, in particular, [6; 9; 10; 20; 22; 30; 41; 53; 55; 56; 58; 61; 67; 69; 
70; 83; 84; 90; 91; 95; 106]). Various typologies of the corruption 
relationships [1; 4–6; 12; 17; 48; 53; 56; 60; 68; 70; 79; 87; 99; 113]) 
and theoretical (explanatory) models of corruption [3; 25; 33; 53; 90; 
105; 119] have been presented to the scientific community. 
For several decades, social scientists have argued about the implica-
tions and effects of corruption, including hypothetical positive effects 
[15; 16; 21; 25–27; 32; 42; 47; 53; 57; 63; 69; 70; 72; 74; 75; 77; 78; 
82; 100; 101; 103]. Regardless of whether these are recognized or de-
nied, the ethical perspective continues to exist in the background of this 
subject, receiving distinct (sometimes religious) attention in a number 
of studies [14; 18; 31; 88; 93; 119]. When considering the topic of cor-
ruption, an almost obligatory “option” is to provide recommendations 
for the fight against this evil (see, among others, [4; 7; 13; 49; 53; 60; 
66; 70; 87; 91; 92])6.
Nevertheless, scientific interest in this subject does not weaken, and 
it would be an oversimplification to explain it using only the vitality of 
corrupt practices. In some respect, such oversimplification is evidence 
of the academic powerlessness on the matter and an incapability to pro-
pose solutions, explanations and recommendations. Thus, O’Connor 
6A large number of works devoted to the study of corruption in concrete countries 
and geo-political regions were left aside in this review.
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and Fischer state that despite considerable scientific efforts, “the factors 
leading to corruption are not well understood” [83, p. 644]. Wedel “argues 
that prevailing approaches to corruption may make it more difficult to 
see contemporary forms of the age-old phenomenon and are ill-equipped 
to study them” [119, p. 453]. As Lambsdorff believes, “we need more 
theoretical inspiration that is able to direct our energies better in the fight 
against corruption” [70, p. 28].
We reflect further on the popular opinion in modern literature on in-
stitutional treatment of corruption and show its limitations (next section). 
It is necessary to review critically the concept of “institute” so that these 
limitations can be overcome, and in section ‘What does it mean to call 
something a “social institute”?’, some principal ideas in this regard are 
offered. Section ‘Institutional signs of corrupt practices’, which is focused 
on claimed subject matter, provides an analysis of the phenomenon of cor-
ruption in terms of its compliance with the suggested institutional criteria. 
Section ‘Discussion’ is devoted to theoretical and practical conclusions.
The institutionally focused treatments of corruption
One of the most promising approaches in studying corruption is the 
institutional approach (see, in particular: [2; 11; 13; 60; 70; 87; 92; 105; 
119]). There are two principled versions of this approach.
(I) The first and rather typical approach is the exogenous approach, 
in which social institutes (primarily state) are considered an environment 
of corruption. This is a favorite conceptual framework for cross-cultural 
comparisons, the emphasis of which is placed, as a rule, on the connection 
between the levels of democracy, political freedom, parliamentary and 
judicial systems on the one hand and the level of corruption, on the other 
(see, e.g., [29, p. 15–16; 114, p. 20]. Although not all studies confirm this 
connection, the literature widely corroborates the statement that ‘political 
institutions matter’ (the last phrase Daniel Lederman, Norman V. Loay-
za, and Rodrigo R. Soares put in the very title of their article [71, p. 1]). 
Within the exogenous approach, the institutionalization of corruption 
is often understood as something that extends to state structures and 
penetrates into statehood, i.e., de facto takes over public institutions:
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‘The de facto takeover of public institutions for business interests or 
criminal activity constitutes an extreme case of state capture. In such 
instances, corrupt or criminal networks penetrate executive institu-
tions at critical points’ [59, p. 27]. 
This view on corruption understands it as an institutional pathology 
[59, p. 31] or a malignant disease – the latter is a favorite metaphor in 
the analysis of this phenomenon.
(II) An endogenous approach, where the corruption itself is consid-
ered an institute. The acceptability of such an approach was put forth as 
early as 1907 by Francis E. McGovern:
‘Political corruption is not simply dishonesty in the public service; 
neither is it merely a phase of crime in general, nor even of crime 
committed by those who hold public office. …It is, indeed, a unique 
and highly complex thing; an institution, if you please, rather than a 
condition of society or a temper or tendency of any class of individ-
uals’ [76, p. 266].
Today, this approach is gaining strength and becoming almost com-
monplace, although very few authors demonstrate it in its exposed form. 
Thus, underlining the institutional nature of corruption, the authors put 
an appropriate emphasis on it in the very title of their work, ‘The Hidden 
Order of Corruption’ [87]. However, nowhere in this text did we find 
any wording that clearly links corruption and social institutes – as has 
been done, e.g., by Teorell:
‘…corruption …<is> an institution in itself, rather than…some form 
of illicit behavior’ [105, p. 3].
The most typical viewpoint for the endogenous version is the neo-in-
stitutional treatment of corruption as an informal institute with all ac-
cents intrinsic to this approach – namely, the base understanding of 
the institute as ‘the rules of the game in a society’ [80, p. 3]; the atten-
tion to the question of historical rootedness, or ‘the inbuilt inertia (or 
path-dependency) of corrupt institutional systems’ [92]; and the specific 
institutional-economic viewpoint on corruption structures as a way of 
reducing uncertainty and risk reduction (see, e.g., [87, p. 2]). It is from 
neo-institutionalism that the model ‘principal-agent’, which still domi-
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nates the field of the theoretical analysis of corruption (see, particularly, 
[70; 87]), is borrowed. 
While not questioning ‘... the importance of thinking about corruption 
as “the rules of the game”, that is, as an <informal> institution’ [105, 
p. 2], we believe that it is necessary to critically examine the very con-
cept of ‘institute’ that gives some theoretical increment to understanding 
the nature of corruption. 
What does it mean to call something a ‘social institute’?
As stated above, the conceptual and methodological framework of 
the institutional analysis of corruption (in the endogenous version) is 
neo-institutionalism, and this, we believe, results in a certain stagnation 
of the theoretical reflection of this phenomenon. The methodological 
weakness of the neo-institutional approach to the analysis of corruption 
is, in our view, not that this approach is fundamentally wrong but that it 
leaves too little room for problem statements and the further development 
of the question under discussion. 
To return to the space of possible questions about the nature of cor-
ruption, it is helpful to ask what it means to call something a ‘social in-
stitute’. A brief overview of the most important consequences to which 
the use of this term refers will allow for a more responsible return to the 
issue of the institutional nature of corruption than that is demanded by 
neo-institutional methodology. 
A sociologically profound consideration of the social institute forces 
us to recognize that it is something more than ‘the rules of the game’ 
[80, p. 3]. Treating the institute as a set of ‘formal rules and informal 
constraints, and the effectiveness of their enforcement’ [80, p. 9] pro-
vides a better approximation of the nature of the institutional reality; 
however, it requires a clear explication of the ideas and criteria that 
constitute it. The first, metaphorical definition of institute received the 
most vivid response from the research community, although it provokes 
an oversimplified and, strictly speaking, not quite proper understand-
ing of the specific nature of this phenomenon. Indeed, ‘the rules of the 
games’ govern all aspects of human relationships, including those that 
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could not be called an institute7; if such aspects were called institutes, 
practically everything related to human structures would be considered 
a social institute. The approach shown in [45, p. 21] is representative 
in this respect:
‘…we may define institutions as systems of established and prevalent 
social rules that structure social interactions… Language, money, law, 
systems of weights and measures, table manners, and firms (and other 
organizations) are thus all institutions’.
The consideration of such different social phenomena, as noted above, 
questions the usefulness and necessity of the very concept of the ‘social 
institute’. This blurring of the concept occurs because the neo-institution-
alism overlooks the complex, multilayered nature of institutional reality.
Essential propositions
The social institute is a complex, multi-layered, indirect, transperson-
al form of social regulation that is species-specific for human communi-
ties and connected with the need to govern access to the prime resources 
that sustain the biological and social existence of human beings. 
Multi-layered. Because the institute contains both behavioral and ab-
stract ideal aspects, the latter are the basic principles of its functioning, 
and sociocultural maxims ensure its legitimation in society.
Indirect. In the institute, one can observe not simply direct interactions 
among people in a certain situation (e.g., in their greeting ritual) but more 
of a system of rules “lining” a rather extensive zone of human relations. 
While ‘simple’ interactions are assessed first by the extent to which they 
meet the needs and expectations of communicating people (and some 
violations of the rules may even welcome here), the institute is estimated 
primarily by how well it handles a specific area of human interaction. 
Simplifying slightly, it can be said that if we estimate the interactions on 
7Common rituals of greetings or culturally accepted modes of communication be-
tween un-familiar people in the neutral public place (for instance, on a bus) are good ex-
amples. As shown by the classical ethnomethodological studies, non-compliance with 
the unwritten rules of game normal for such situations involves rather efficient informal 
sanctions (e.g., indignation, condemnation, conflict).
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their own account in the ‘simple’ interactions (the game), we estimate 
essentially the rules of interaction in the institute (the rules of the game).
Transpersonality. What is at issue is the recognition of a peculiar 
‘subjectivity’ of the institute. Being a complex entity, the institute ‘lives’ 
within certain limits, according to its own laws and obeying the logic of 
interrelation between the constituent concepts and the logic of “truss-
ing” with other social institutes. Here, we come close to the concept of 
Institutional Logics (see, particularly, [19; 35; 51; 107–109]), which is 
an essential point of institutional theory that deserves special discussion. 
Finally, the resource aspect of the institute. The institute arises where 
there is a conflict of interests and competition for resources. The institute 
shapes and formalizes this competition by creating rules for access to 
restricted resources. Because institutional rules are created in resource 
important points, it is appropriate to expect them in the field of, for ex-
ample, marriage but not in the love or friendship spheres. 
Before moving on from the designated conceptual framework to an 
analysis of the phenomenon of corruption, let us summarize the basic 
ideas about the primary saliencies and components of this hard-catch-
ing reality that social thinkers are trying to capture in the notion of the 
‘social institute’8. 
Composition of the social institute
It is acceptable to ontologically understand four types of reality in the 
social institute: norms of law, common consciousness attitudes, the every-
day status / role practices and the organizations. Corresponding approaches 
are shown in Fig. 1, which reproduces two ontological axes: the first oppos-
es mental and behavioral phenomena, and the second opposes an ordinary 
and official (formal) levels of social life. Practically all of the definitions 
found in the literature can be placed into one of these four quadrants. 
The right side of the scheme reproduces the mental constructions 
that are rooted in specialized and ordinary consciousness and ensure 
8Rather typical in this regard is the beginning of the "Social Institutions" entry in 
the Stan-ford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: ‘The term, “social institution” is somewhat 
unclear both in ordinary language and in the philosophical literature…’ [102].
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the functioning of the institutes. In the first case, it is a question of legal 
norms; in the second, it is a question of such slices of ordinary mentality 
as (a) beliefs about how ‘the world works’; (b) knowledge of ‘rules of 
behavior’ in this or that sphere; (c) psychological attitudes toward certain 
types of behavior in certain circumstances.
The left part of the scheme contains behavioral approaches to the 
understanding of institutional reality according to which institutes find 
manifestation in real practice – the official or informal patterns of inter-
action that are formed in certain areas of life.
Each of the quadrants of this scheme deserves a detailed discussion, 
which would take us far from the topic of the article. However, it is clear 
that the lower part of the scheme, which shows the informal aspects of in-
stitutional reality, is easily projected onto corruption, which in turn is em-
bodied in both mental and psychological attitudes and behavioral patterns. 
Less obvious is the limit to which, and whether it is possible at all, can it 
speak to the legal and organizational embodiment of corruption. Meanwhile, 
these aspects are the aspects that, in our opinion, are crucial in identifying 
the institutional reality; therefore, we focus on them more thoroughly below. 
Legal and organizational aspects of the social institute
The point of view that traces back to John Rogers Commons, ac-
cording to whom institutes are connected with a specialized reflection 
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and find expression in legal norms, is not popular today, although it is 
sometimes discussed in economic literature. While it is hardly expedi-
ent to reduce social institutes to the rules of law (in this case, the very 
need for it as a separate category is simply lost), the legal aspect, in our 
opinion, is obligatory to obtain a correct interpretation of the topic of 
discussion. The mere consideration of those structures, which usually 
refer to institutes, e.g., state political systems, family, church, structures 
of material and immaterial production, property and education, and me-
dia structures, forces one to admit the legal aspect as sine qua non for 
the institute because each of these structures has quite distinct formal 
restrictions. The obligation of using normative and legal dimensions to 
understand the institute appears particularly in that resistance evident in 
scientific usage expressions such as ‘friendship as a social institute’ or 
‘love as a social institute’. At the same time, both common and scientif-
ic word usage freely use the expression ‘marriage as a social institute’.
Institutional restrictions can certainly act both in the form of a le-
gal system intrinsic to the modern civilized society and in the form of 
‘customary law’, or the informal rules that support informal institutes. 
Undoubtedly, informal legal restrictions that do not have legal expres-
sion may exist in an institute alongside formal ones. However, the legal 
or quasi-legal dimensions seem to be required in the definition of the 
institute; without them, from our point of view, there is no institute at all. 
The tradition to include organizational structures in the concept of 
‘institute’ apparently departs from the institutionalism and meets its 
strongest resistance. It is known that North strongly objected to the 
conceptual convergence between the institute and the organization [80, 
p. 4–5], although some researchers are trying to challenge this view [45]. 
This point of view, according to which ‘separating the analysis of the 
underlying rules from the strategy of the players is a necessary prereq-
uisite to building a theory of institutions’ [80, p. 5], seems to be correct 
essentially and very deep in its theoretical message. It presupposes the 
treatment of an institute as ideal by its natural formation, which has a 
more or less adequate manifestation in concrete forms of movement of 
social reality.
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At the same time, the theme of organizations is very important for 
institutional discourse. The organization, in our view, is the most im-
portant symptom of the very existence of an institute. As noted above, 
the institutes arise in important spheres of public life and are connected, 
in one way or another, with the competition over life goods. In consid-
eration of this competition, the institutional rules require mechanisms 
of “the effectiveness of their enforcement” [80, p. 9], which is why or-
ganizations emerge.
Finally, one important aspect, the need for which is particularly ap-
parent in the corruption context, is connected with ideal and value legit-
imation of institutes. It is obvious that the existence of all institutes that 
are recognized by a given society, in one way or another, is ‘authorized’ 
by the ideal and value maxims supporting this society, whether they be 
religious, moral, political, ideological or philosophical principles. To 
what extent the so-called ‘shadow institutes’ hold such legitimation is a 
crucial question to draw conclusions about the true nature of those rela-
tionships, which have most likely been slightly prematurely called ‘the 
institutes’. For example, thieves’ clans, the Mafia or Camorra, are perhaps 
institutes because they are supported by peculiar ‘codes of honour’ that 
are accepted by the local subculture. It is easy to understand that this is 
directly relevant to the analysis of corruption.
Thus, the existence of the institute presupposes the presence of two 
fundamental conditions: ‘from below’, or a competitive resource con-
text, and ‘from above’, or the value legitimation of those relations, both 
of which form the basis of the institute. Concerning corruption, the first 
condition is certainly satisfied, though the second is most likely not. 
Thus arises a theoretical ‘grid of coordinates’, within which it is 
possible to soundly question corruption as an institutional phenomenon.
Institutional signs of corrupt practices
It is generally acceptable to distinguish between two levels of corrup-
tion, notably petty (local, elementary, everyday) corruption, which does 
not go beyond a single case interaction, and grand or system corruption 
[34; 56; 79; 87; 89; 116 and others], which is characterized by large-scale 
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and regular deals and, on the whole, is close to what is called ‘institu-
tional corruption’. At a cursory glance, such a division seems correct, 
but further consideration makes it less convincing. For example, when 
a businessman bribes a customs officer or a student at a driving school 
pays the instructor to let them pass the driving exams administered by the 
traffic police, are these cases ‘local’ and ‘amateur’ corruption, or there is 
a complex system of the relationships behind such episodes?
To that point, let us note that the fact that a corrupt transaction involves 
more than two individuals (student, instructor, and one or more persons in 
the traffic police, as in the latter case) is a symptom but not the diagnosis 
of the institutional nature of the illegal deal. Institutional and collectively 
organized corruption are different things, and they are diagnosed for dif-
ferent reasons. In fact, they represent the orthogonal axis of dimension of 
this phenomenon (Fig. 2). The institutionalized state corruption does not 
necessarily imply the existence of a dense network of personal contacts. 
Conversely, a personal arrangement between limited and individually 
foreseeable number of participants does not reveal the petty corruption.
To issue an institutional ‘diagnosis’ about the nature of a corrupt deal, 
one must consistently analyze using the criteria defined in the previous 
section. 
Resource prerequisites of corruption deals. All corrupt relationships 
emerge in resource-demanding spheres of social life and are, one way 
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or another, connected to competition over life goods. Nevertheless, the 
degree of resource intensity in different situations strongly varies. For 
example, in a case when a small bribe is given to avoid a large fine for 
a minor administrative violation (e.g., travel without a ticket on public 
transport) or for jumping a queue, the tension is not so high that a ‘shad-
ow procedure’ or an institutional structure serving it could emerge. In 
such cases, to give/take or not to give/take a bribe is a matter of personal 
choice and preference, depending on the situation and type of interaction. 
In regard to more significant resources for which there is the possibility 
of reallocation of vital goods, you should expect not spontaneous but 
institutionalized relations. 
‘Legal’ regulation. One might ask what legal regulation may refer 
to because corruption is illegal by definition. However, it is known 
that all shadow institutes of society live by the rules (‘by rules and 
concepts’, as they say in Russian criminal environments). While these 
rules have no formal legal status, of course, they are quite well mani-
fested, standardized and, in most cases, tacitly accepted for execution 
by ‘the players’ of the corresponding sphere of regulation. As Calhoun 
emphasizes, informal ‘norms may carry greater weight than codified 
laws’ [29, p. 17]. 
Let us stress the most important point, which is an unmistakable 
symptom of the institutionalization of corrupt practice – that is, its 
impersonal nature. That is not the illegal transaction between two 
individuals but an ‘ideal impersonal exchange’ [116, p. 17], which is 
a part of the prescribed “order of the things” and often not even per-
ceived as illegal. 
The existence of an ‘invisible order of things’ testifies the movement 
of corrupt practices towards institutionalization, and the destruction of 
this order is perceived by society as painful as any institutional crisis. 
The anomie, which was characteristic of Russian society in the second 
half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and connected with 
the destruction of the Soviet institutional structures, including corrupt 
ones, is extremely curious in this regard. As the former Soviet directors 
said, the previous communist authorities strictly complied with the limits 
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prescribed for a certain hierarchical rank in their corruption claims. The 
new ‘democratic power’, which did not know the ‘rules’ and took bribes 
‘not on a rank’, was perceived by economic managers as ‘lawlessness’ 
[from private conversation]9.
However, regardless of the distinctiveness of the regulating aspects of 
corruption transactions, there is no doubt that corruption has never been 
and is unlikely ever to be an object of a specialized legal reflection. This 
means that it has never been and will never be a real institute.
Corruption formed through organizations. One of the most serious 
symptoms of the institutionalization of corruption is the emergence of 
the special organizations that service it. It is a rather common practice 
in Russia to set up officially registered firms that specialize in providing 
so-called ‘consulting services’ and ‘help’ resolve issues in state/munici-
pal institutions. In such cases, it is possible to observe the emergence of 
specific infrastructure of corruption transactions – ‘a complex organiza-
tional architecture that facilitate the implementation of corrupt exchange’ 
[116, p. 8]. However, more often, corruption simply parasitizes on the 
official structure. Thereby, as Lambsdorf emphasizes, transaction costs 
of corruption deals are decreased: 
‘…there hardly exists such a thing as a purely corrupt relationship. Cor-
rupt deals are only commonly embedded in more complex relationships 
between different actors. More often than not, these relationships entail 
also a variety of legal transactions and even charitable ones. …Preex-
isting legal relationships can lower these transaction costs and serve 
as a basis for the enforcement of corrupt arrangements’ [70, p. 210].
Value legitimation. The impersonal state of an institutional procedure 
removes substantial value questions. Formal establishments are found to be 
more important than values, and there is a certain social logic in the state 
of such things. It would be impossible to accompany every social action 
with reflections about ‘the final values’. If the rules of the game are set, then 
people usually just play by the rules, without asking themselves ‘philosoph-
ical questions’. This is true to a certain extent with respect to corruption. 
9Changing ‘the rules of the corrupt games’, which occurred in Russia with the ad-
vent of ‘perestroika’, has been recorded in a number of studies; see, e.g., [100].
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‘Where corruption becomes a regulated system through a process of 
informal institutionalization, moral costs are profoundly undermined’ 
[87, p. 73].
At the same time, to be viable, social institutes must have a minimum 
of values and moral legitimation. This is the most vulnerable criterion 
that gives some hope that corruption never will find the status of a full-
fledged institute. 
As researchers emphasize, people morally condemn corruption even 
when they are forced to play by its rules (see, e.g. [60; 92]). The fact that 
corruption is typically not supported by common values and principles is 
a serious obstacle to treating it as a full-grown, true social institute. The 
reservation ‘typically’, however, is not casual. Some cultures are said to 
have the peculiar ethics of behavior that justifies corruption. 
‘Anthropologist Larissa Lomnitz… finds that people in rural Mexico 
differentiate between correct and incorrect corruption. Corruption, 
she writes, is deemed acceptable when its advantages “spill over to 
the rest of the population”… Even people who engage in “corrupt” 
practices may do so in terms of their own ethics, which may defy 
outside views of what corruption is, as sociologist Marina Kurkchi-
yan… documents’ [119, p. 474].
According to historians, in Russia sources of the favorable attitude 
to the practice of ‘voluntary offerings’ date to the XI century, when an 
institute of ‘nursing’, i.e., keeping officials at the expense of the local 
population, began to form. Thus, a bribe is a logical development of this 
institute, and as such, it is fixed in the Russian social system. Without the 
shadow of a bribe, the state bureaucratic machinery simply would not 
work. It is apparently this institutional bribe that to explain the amazing 
loyalty of the Russian social consciousness to this phenomenon, traces 
of which can still be observed today. 
In a recent Russian study on corruption, a respondent says ‘...the 
question is about real gratitude, and any work should be paid. I take it 
to be quite normal, and I believe that if a man can receive big benefit 
from any procedure, it may be, as in old Russia, ancient times – ten 
percent…that is, the tithe… it is all in a day’s work’. 
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It is known that some criminal subcultures (thieves’ clans, mafia) are 
based on a specific system of ideal legitimation and have their ‘moral 
principles’ and ‘codes of honour’, albeit perverted, which makes it possi-
ble to observe shadow institutional structures in them. Some researchers 
see something similar to that in corruption structures: 
‘…Within a neoinstitutional frame, we ...pointed to the institution-
alization of alternate norms that favor corruption. …In conclusion, 
when governance mechanisms emerge in the market for corrupt ex-
changes, the latter tends to reproduce itself, along with a system of 
norms and principles that – while opposite from the legal order (whose 
supporting values are weakened) and far from being anomie – can 
assume an “ethical” significance of its own’ [87, p. 76]. 
However, such statements are too categorical to treat them uncritical-
ly. Let us pay attention to the important fact: corruption is not a subcul-
ture. It is not “capsuled” as subcultures are but is spread in a society. The 
corrupted official belongs simultaneously to two worlds, the official and 
criminal ones, and therefore does not have a particular “code of honour” 
and is not respected in either world. 
Historians’ and anthropologists’ tolerant and even favorable treatment 
of corruption demonstrates, in our view, not as much a value legitimation 
of corruption as the acceptance of it as an element of the pre-existing 
order of things. 
Conceptualization of the social order. The attitude of a society 
towards corruption is a mental-psychological complex that is not 
reduced at all to a unique estimate of this phenomenon based on in-
disputable moral criteria (as some researchers call it – see, e.g., [119, 
p. 490]). The moral legitimation and conceptualization of the social 
order are not the same ways of reflecting social reality. The first as-
sumes the appeal to unconditional moral criteria and ‘final values’ of 
human existence. The second is a system of ideas represented by ‘as 
the world is arranged’. Corruption is one of those phenomena where 
the gap between these mental complexes is most evident; in this gap, 
the most profound mental causes of the persistence of corruption 
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should be sought. Researchers have repeatedly paid attention to this 
circumstance: 
‘…even people that think corruption is morally wrong are likely to 
take part because they see no point in doing otherwise... What is 
important is their beliefs about the other agents’ beliefs, or in other 
words, their beliefs about how the world works…; This was nicely 
captured by the Swedish Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal already in 
1968…: “Well, if everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn’t I be cor-
rupt”… As is well known, it makes no sense to be the only honest 
player in a rotten game because that will not change the game’ [92].
Discussion and Conclusion
Based on the analysis presented above, we believe that it would be 
promising to consider corruption within the theoretical model of a diffuse 
institute. This thesis makes the following assumptions: 
(1) Not all corrupt practices have institutional characteristics (i.e., 
corruption episodes, defined in the literature as petty corruption). 
(2) Corruption, which the research literature names as a system or grand 
corruption, shows signs of institutionalization, which is manifested above 
all in the existence of special organizations that serve corrupt transactions. 
The existence of tacitly ‘codified’ rules of behavior in this or that 
sphere and common ideas of the social order (‘how the world works’) 
are also important but not crucial symptoms of institutionally fixing 
corruption in the social system. 
Neither the first nor the second paragraph contains anything that 
would not be discussed in research literature. The conceptual increment 
of this work is connected to the third point. 
(3) No one, not even the most corrupt society, has a type of corruption 
that would have the characteristics of a full-fledged institute. Corrup-
tion is devoid of the complex multilayered structure that distinguishes 
the “real” institutes. As mentioned above, the top, ideal level of moral 
maxims and culture values is absent in corruption. The power of corrup-
tion lies in behavioral practices but not in an ideal grounding of these 
practices, whether it be the law or common values. The impossibility of 
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justifying corruption at the level of basic principles of a culture is the 
main obstacle for its institutionalization.
In the case of corruption, the trait of transpersonality is also absent. 
It is important to note that impersonality and transpersonality are by 
no means the same thing. The first assumes the existence of rules of 
a game that are obligatory for all ‘players’; the second designates the 
specific subjectivity, referring to the famous concept of Karl Popper’s 
“Third World”. In contrast toной сдачи последних, выдающая права. 
real institutes, corrupt structures are devoid of the conceptual and ideal 
framework that is achieved primarily through specialized reflection on 
respective social relations. Accordingly, unlike the true institute, corrup-
tion has no internal dynamics of development. 
However, in many cases, corruption is similar to the institute. These 
cases take the character of impersonal procedure and are supported or-
ganizationally. It is needless to emphasize that this type of ‘institutional 
building’ is due to the close connection of corrupt practices with scarce 
resources – it is precisely this fact that gives corrupt affairs durability 
and an impulse towards institutionalizing.
To capture conceptually the contradictions and instability of the in-
stitutional status of corruption, we believe that it would be promising to 
talk about it as a diffuse institute. What necessitates such a compromise 
in terminology?
First, ipso facto, one must recognize the seriousness of the social pa-
thology because, as is emphasized by many researchers, ‘institutions are 
the kinds of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make 
up the stuff of social life’ [45, p. 2]. 
Second, diagnosing the institutional nature of corruption, we rec-
ognize thereby that we are dealing not only with the “habit” of giving 
bribes but also with the embeddedness of the latter in a procedural order 
that is fixed organizationally.
Third, recognizing diffuse corruption, i.e., the defective, ill-organized 
institutional status of corruption, allows us to emphasize the theoretical 
and practical attitude towards it. These accents are connected first to the 
ratio of the mental and behavioral “registers” of institutional reality. As 
www.ej.soc-journal.ru
© Современные исследования социальных проблем (электронный научный журнал), 
Modern Research of Social Problems, № 11(67), 2016
— 266 —
emphasized above, corruption is strong by not mental but by behavioral 
schemes. This means that the fight against corruption at the ethical lev-
el is meaningless or, as it is called in Russian, “trying to force an open 
door” (in English, ‘preaching to the converted’). The point is not that 
society has incorrect ethical ideas of ‘what is good and what is bad’. 
One should fight not against ‘erroneous ideas’, ‘bad habits’ or ‘wrong 
values’ but against ‘the order of things’.
The status of corruption as a diffuse institute explains the difficulties 
of the fight against it. On the one hand, corruption has the strength of 
institutional arrangement. On the other hand, it possesses the flexibil-
ity and adaptability of informal practices. In such circumstances, it 
would be reasonable not to re-educate or to replace the “bad players” 
but to change radically the rules of the game, which would break the 
established decision-making procedures and the functioning of dif-
ferent spheres of social life. Perhaps the struggle against corruption 
should be something similar to a ‘Big Bang’, as proposed by some 
researchers [92]. 
Treating corruption as a diffuse institute certainly involves an assess-
ment of potential efficiency of different counteracting measures. How-
ever, above all, it is a question of diagnosing this social phenomenon, 
which should be more profound and nuanced than simply understanding 
it as a system of informal rules of the game. 
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